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DİFERANSİYEL GÜÇ ANALİZİNE DAYANIKLI RSA KRİPTO SİSTEMİNİN 
DONANIM İLE GERÇEKLENMESİ 
ÖZET 
Bu çalışmada, RSA kripto sistemi donanımsal olarak gerçeklenmiş ve daha sonra 
bir yan kanal analizi çeşidi olan Diferansiyel Güç Analizi (DGA) ile yapılacak 
saldırılara karşı dayanıklı hale getirilmiştir. RSA kripto sisteminde şifreleme ve şifre 
çözme, M mesaj, E açık anahtar, N sistem parametresi olmak üzere, ME (mod N) 
şeklindeki modüler üs alma işlemi ile yapılır. Bu çalışmadaki RSA kripto sisteminde, 
Xilinx Sahada Programlanabilir Kapı Dizisi (SPKD (FPGA)) donanım olarak 
kullanılmıştır. Modüler üs alma işlemi, art arda çarpmalar ile yapılır. Bu 
gerçeklemede kullanılan Montgomery modüler çarpıcı, Elde Saklamalı Toplayıcılar 
ile gerçeklenmiştir. Donanım gerçeklemelerinde kullanılan Elde Saklamalı 
Toplayıcılar, 3 adet k-bitlik toplananı, 2 adet k-bitlik toplam haline düşürerek, uzun 
sayıların hızlı çalışma frekanslarında toplanabilmasını sağlarlar. RSA şifreleme 
algoritmasının işlemleri boyunca Elde Saklamalı gösterilim kullanılmıştır. Böylece 
çarpıcının işlem hacminin yüksek olması hedeflenmiştir. Çarpıcının 512-bit anahtar 
uzunluğu kullanarak 140,41 Mbit/s işlem hacmi ile çalıştığı görülmüştür. RSA 
şifreleme veya şifre çözme işleminin, 512-bit anahtar uzunluğu için, Xilinx 
XC2V1500 üzerinde ortalama 150,5 Kbit/s işlem hacmine sahip olduğu ve 10240 
dilim yer kapladığı görülmüştür. Saldırgan, güç tüketim bilgisinden yararlanarak 
kripto sistemin gizli anahtarını bulabilir. Bu saldırılara Güç Analizi saldırıları denir ve 
iki türü vardır: Basit Güç Analizi ve Diferansiyel Güç Analizi saldırıları. Basit Güç 
Analizi saldırıları tek ölçüm ve gözle tanıma ile yapılırken, Diferansiyel Güç Analizi 
saldırıları, çok sayıda ölçüm ve istatiksel analiz ile yapılır. Güç Analizi saldırıları, 
CMOS teknolojisinin günümüzdeki yaygın kullanımından doğan, lojik kapılardaki 
0→1 geçişindeki güç tüketimini temel alır. Bu tezde gerçekleştirilen ilk RSA 
devresinin mimarisi, Basit Güç Analizi saldırılarından gizli anahtarın elde edilmesini 
engellerken, anahtarın Hamming ağırlığının öğrenilmesine veya Diferansiyel Güç 
Analizi ile anahtarın kendisinin elde edilmesine karşı duramaz. Diferansiyel Güç 
Analizine karşı durma yöntemleri arasında donanımsal ve algoritmik çözümler 
bulunmaktadır. Itoh ve diğ. tarafından önerilen Rastgele Tablolu Pencere Yöntemi 
(RT-WM) algoritması ile RSA şifreleme algoritmasına getirilen değişiklik, algoritmik 
karşı durma yöntemlerinden biridir ve donanım üzerinde gerçeklenmemiştir. Bu 
tezde yapılan ikinci gerçeklemede, ilk gerçeklemenin üzerine bu algoritmanın 
getirdiği değişiklikler uygulanmıştır. 512-bit anahtar uzunluğu, 2-bit pencere genişliği 
ve 3-bitlik bir rastgele sayı kullanılarak, Xilinx XCV2600E üzerinde ortalama 18,43 
Kbit/s işlem hacmine ve 22712 dilim sayısına ulaşılmaktadır. DGA’ya karşı 
korumasız ve korumalı her iki mimari, mevcut ölçüm düzeneğinde test edilebilir hale 
gelmeleri için birer kez de XCV1000E üzerinde gerçeklenmiştir. Korumasız 
gerçeklemede 81,06 MHz saat frekansı, 104,85 Kb/s işlem hacmi ve 4,88 ms toplam 
üs alma süresi elde edilmiş ve 9037 dilimlik alan kullanılmıştır. Korumalı 
gerçeklemede ise 66,66 MHz saat frekansı, 84,42 Kb/s işlem hacmi ve 6,06 ms 
toplam üs alma süresi elde edilmiş; XCV1000E içinde hazır bulunan blok 
SelectRAM yapısı ile birlikte 10986 dilimlik alan kullanılmıştır. Korumalı gerçekleme, 
korumasız ile karşılaştırıldığında, toplam sürenin %24,2 arttığı, işlem hacminin 
 x 
de %19,5 azaldığı görülmektedir. Tüm donanımsal gerçeklemeler VHDL dili 
kullanılarak yapılmış; fonksiyonel doğrulama için C/C++ dilleri kullanılmıştır. 
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DIFFERENTIAL POWER ANALYSIS RESISTANT HARDWARE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM 
SUMMARY 
In this study, RSA cryptosystem was implemented on hardware and afterwards it 
was modified to be resistant against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks, 
which are a type of side channel attacks. The encryption and decryption in an RSA 
cryptosystem is modular exponentiation, ME (mod N), where M is the message, E is 
the public key, and N is a system parameter. In this study, Xilinx Field 
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices have been used as hardware. Modular 
exponentiation is realized with sequential multiplications. The Montgomery modular 
multiplier in this implementation has been realized with Carry-Save Adders. Carry-
Save Adders, which are used in hardware implementations, ensure that long 
numbers are added with fast working frequencies, by reducing 3 k-bit summands to 
2 k-bit sums. Carry-Save representation has been used throughout the RSA 
encryption algorithm. Thus, the throughput of the multiplier is aimed to be high. The 
multiplier, implemented on XC2V1500 using 512-bit key length, is observed to be 
working with a throughput of 140,41 Mb/s. RSA encryption or decryption process for 
512-bit key length on Xilinx XC2V1500 takes an average of 150,5 Kb/s throughput 
and occupies an area of 10240 slices. The attacker can find the secret key of the 
cryptosystem using the power consumption information. This kind of attacks are 
called Power Analysis attacks and has two types: Simple Power Analysis and 
Differential Power Analysis attacks. While Simple Power Analysis attacks are 
performed with a single measurement and visual recognition, Differential Power 
Analysis attacks are performed with many measurements and statistical analysis. 
Power Analysis attacks, are based on the power consumption of 0→1 transitions of 
the logic gates, which results from the presently common usage of CMOS 
technology. In this thesis, the primarily implemented RSA circuit’s architecture 
prevents the extraction of the secret key using Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks, 
while it cannot prevent the extraction of the Hamming weight of the key or the 
extraction of the key using Differential Power Analysis attacks. There are hardware 
and algorithmic solutions among the countermeasures against Differential Power 
Analysis. The modification to the RSA encryption algorithm that comes with the 
Randomized Table Window Method (RT-WM) proposed by Itoh et al. is one of the 
algorithmic countermeasures and has not been implemented on hardware. In the 
second implementation of this thesis, the changes within this algorithm have been 
applied over the first implementation. Realized with 512-bit key length, 2-bit window 
length, and, a 3-bit random number, on Xilinx XCV2600E, it takes an average of 
18,43 Kb/s throughput and an area of 22712 slices is achieved. Both the 
unprotected and the DPA resistant architectures have been implemented also on 
XCV1000E, in order for them to become testable with the available measurement 
setup. The unprotected implementation has resulted in 81,06 MHz of clock 
frequency, 104,85 Kb/s of throughput, and 4,88 ms of total exponentiation time and 
occupied an area of 9037 slices. The protected implementation resulted in 66,66 
MHz of clock frequency, 84,42 Kb/s of throughput, and 6,06 ms of total 
exponentiation time and occupied an area of 10986 slices together with the use of 
the built-in block SelectRAM structure inside XCV1000E. When comparing the 
 xii 
protected implementation with the unprotected, it can be seen that the total time has 
increased by 24,2%, while the throughput has decreased by 19,5%. All hardware 
implementations were realized using the VHDL language; and C/C++ have been 
used for functional verification. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
RSA is a widely used public-key cryptosystem. RSA encryption is a one-way 
function, which is not possible to reverse without knowing the private key [1]. RSA is 
realized with large operands, such that the key length and the operands are greater 
than or equal to 512 bits. The encryption and decryption in an RSA cryptosystem is 
modular exponentiation: ME (mod N). Custom implementations in hardware are 
more appropriate for the RSA cryptosystem in order to be efficient in area and 
speed [2].  
In this study, a hardware architecture of the RSA cryptosystem has been proposed 
and implemented on Xilinx FPGA families. In this implementation a Montgomery 
Modular Multiplier [3] with Carry Save Adder [4] based logic and representation has 
been used to speed up the calculations. 
Side-channel attacks [5] are attacks, based on the information that is retrieved from 
the device, but is neither the plaintext nor the ciphertext. Power Analysis (PA) 
attacks [5] are a type of passive side-channel attacks. In these attacks, the power 
consumption of the circuit is measured while the device is performing an encryption 
or decryption. The private key or information about the private key is retrieved after 
an analysis. PA attacks have two types: Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks and 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [6] attacks. SPA attacks require a single 
measurement, while DPA attacks require many measurements followed by a 
statistical analysis to retrieve information about the private key. There are hardware 
and algorithmic countermeasures against PA attacks. Itoh et al. have proposed an 
algorithmic countermeasure, Randomized Table Window Method (RT-WM), against 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks in [7]. 
The first implementation in this study prevents the extraction of the private key itself, 
while it cannot prevent the leakage of the Hamming weight information of the private 
key when Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack is implemented. The former 
protection is due to the architectural design of the circuit. However, the 
implementation is unprotected against DPA attacks. As the second implementation 
of this study, RT-WM algorithm [7] has been implemented upon the former 
unprotected implementation. 
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1.2 Organization of Thesis 
This thesis presents a differential power analysis resistant hardware implementation 
of the RSA cryptosystem. 
Chapter 2 presents the basics of cryptographic systems and explains about the 
main types of cryptosystems. 
Chapter 3 explains the mathematical background behind the RSA cryptosystem. 
Chapter 4 gives the fundamentals of RSA architecture both algorithmic and 
hardware based. This section is the basis to the architectural choices in the 
implementation. 
Chapter 5 presents the basics of side-channel attacks and gives detail about power 
analysis attacks and the countermeasures against them. 
Chapter 6 explains the implementation done within this study: first the unprotected 
implementation of the RSA cryptosystem, and then the DPA resistant 
implementation. 
Chapter 7 is a review of the thesis and the conclusion is given. 
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2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS 
The word cryptography comes from the Greek words kryptos meaning hidden and 
graphein meaning writing. Cryptography is the study of hidden writing, or the 
science of encrypting and decrypting text [8]. The history of cryptography goes back 
to Egyptians – about 4000 years ago. In the twentieth century it played a crucial role 
in both of the world wars. The predominant practitioners of the art were people 
associated with the military, the diplomatic service and government in general. 
Cryptography was used as a tool to protect national secrets and strategies [9]. 
There are two types of cryptosystems: symmetric and public key. 
2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptosystems 
In symmetric key cryptosystems, Alice and Bob secretly share the key using a 
secure channel. The exposure of the encryption key or the decryption key renders 
the system insecure [10]. 
 
Figure 2.1: Symmetric key cryptosystem communication channel 
There are two main problems in symmetric key cryptosystems [10]. The first is the 
unsafe key exchange. The secure channel between Alice and Bob, which has to be 
established prior to any communication, might in practice, be very difficult to achieve. 
Someone can extract the secret key during the key exchange. The second problem 
is that digital signature is not available in secret key cryptosystems. Since both Alice 
and Bob share the same secret key, it will be ambiguous who has signed the 
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plaintext [10]. To overcome these problems, Diffie and Hellman proposed the public 
key cryptosystems in 1976 [11]. 
2.2 Public Key Cryptosystems 
Diffie and Hellman state in [11] that in a network of n  users, where ( ) 22 nn −  pairs 
can be arranged, it is unrealistic to assume either that all users will be able to wait 
for a key to be sent by some secure physical means or that keys for all ( ) 22 nn −  
pairs can be arranged in advance. They proposed that it was possible to develop 
systems of the type in which two parties communicating solely over a public channel 
and using only publicly known techniques can create a secure connection. They had 
two approaches to the problem, called public key cryptosystems and public key 
distribution systems. 
As proposed by [11], a public key cryptosystem is a pair of families { } { }KKKE ∈  and 
{ } { }KKKD ∈  of algorithms representing invertible transformations, 
{ } { }MMEK →:  (2.1) 
{ } { }MMDK →:  (2.2) 
on a finite message space { }M , such that 
1. for every { }KK ∈ , KE  is the inverse of KD , 
2. for every { }KK ∈  and { }MM ∈ , the algorithms KE  and KD  are easy to 
compute, 
3. for almost every { }KK ∈ , each easily computed algorithm equivalent to KD  
is computationally infeasible to derive from KE , 
4. for every { }KK ∈ , it is feasible to compute inverse pairs KE  and KD  from 
K . 
The third property enables the user to make the encryption algorithm KE  public 
without compromising the security of his secret decryption algorithm KD . The 
cryptographic system now is divided into two as encryption and decryption 
operations, that given a member of one family of one, it is infeasible to find the 
corresponding member of the other. The fourth property guarantees that there is a 
feasible way of computing corresponding pairs of inverse transformations. In 
practice there must be a true random number generator for generating K , out of 
which KE  and KD  pair is generated.  
With this system, the problem of key distribution is simplified: Each user generates a 
pair of inverse transformations, E  and D  and keeps D  as secret. The encryption 
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key E  is made public. This means that anyone can encrypt the messages and send 
them to Bob, while no one else but Bob can decipher the messages intended for 
him. 
In a public key cryptosystem, specifying E  specifies a complete algorithm for 
transforming input messages into output cryptograms. As such a public key system 
is really a set of trap-door one-way functions, which are not really one-way in that 
simply computed inverses exist. It is computationally infeasible to find the inverse 
function out of the forward function. The inverse function can only be easily found 
with the knowledge of certain trap-door information [11]. 
In 1977, an public key cryptosystem example, which meets the criteria defined by 
Diffie and Hellman was proposed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman: the RSA 
cryptosystem [1]. 
2.3 The RSA Cryptosystem 
The RSA cryptosystem [1] uses the same algorithm for both encryption and 
decryption algorithms. Eq.(2.3) shows the encryption algorithm, where M  is the 
message (plaintext), ( )NE,  are the public key pair, and C  is the ciphertext. Eq.(2.4) 
shows the decryption algorithm where D  is the private key. 
( )NMC E mod=   (2.3) 
( )NCM D mod=  (2.4) 
The detailed description and the theory behind the RSA algorithm is given in 
Chapter 3. 
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3. THE RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM 
The RSA cryptosystem was developed by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1977 [1]. 
RSA is a public-key cryptosystem that serves both for encryption-decryption and 
digital signature. Modular encryption is used as encryption and decryption operation 
in RSA. Modular encryption is a trap-door function, which means that it is easy to 
compute in one direction, but impossible to calculate its inverse function, which 
leaves the attacker no choice but to find out the private keys. RSA is used widely in 
cryptography because of its mathematically strong background. 
3.1 Mathematical Background 
Let p  and q  be two distinct large primes, whose product makes up the k -bit 
modulus N . 
pqN = , qp ≠ , 122 1 −<<− kk N . (3.1) 
We select a number E , which will be the public exponent, such that the greatest 
common divisor of E  and )(NΦ is 1 and E  is smaller than N  [10], 
1))(,gcd( =Φ NE , }{ 1,,1 −⋅⋅⋅∈ NE , (3.2) 
where )(NΦ  is Euler’s totient function of N  given by 
( ) ( )11)( −⋅−=Φ qpN . (3.3) 
Afterwards we compute the private key D  with 
( ))(mod1 NED Φ= − . (3.4) 
Usually a small public exponent is selected. The modulus N  and E  are published, 
while, D , p , and q  are kept secret. RSA encryption is performed by a modular 
exponentiation operation as shown by Eq.(3.5) where M  is the message and C  is 
the ciphertext and { }1,,1,0,, −∈ NEMC L  [1]. 
NMC E mod= , { }1,,1,0,, −∈ NEMC L . (3.5) 
And RSA decryption is realized through the same function as RSA encryption as 
shown by Eq.(3.6), 
NCM D mod= , { }1,,1,0,, −∈ NEMC L , (3.6) 
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where M  is the plaintext, C  is the ciphertext, N  and E  are the public keys, and 
D  is the private key. Let us combine Eq.(3.5) and Eq.(3.6): 
NMNC EDD modmod = . (3.7) 
Since we have Eq.(3.8) 
( )( )NED Φ= mod1 , (3.8) 
for some integer K , we can write 
( )NKED Φ+= 1 . (3.9) 
When we substitute ED  in Eq.(3.7) with Eq.(3.9), we derive Eq.(3.10) and Eq.(3.11) 
respectively. 
( ) NMNC NKD modmod 1 Φ+= , (3.10) 
NC D mod ( )( ) NMM KN modΦ⋅= . (3.11) 
From Euler’s theorem we know that, Eq.(3.12) holds for two positive and relatively 
prime integers a  and b  
( ) ba b mod1=Φ . (3.12) 
Using Eq.(3.11) and (3.12), we finally write Eq.(3.13) and (3.14) respectively. 
NMNC KD mod1mod ⋅= , (3.13) 
MNC D =mod , ( ) 1,gcd =NM . (3.14) 
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4. RSA ARCHITECTURE 
An RSA encryption is basically a modular exponentiation [1]. When looked with a 
general perspective, the hardware should include multipliers, adders, dividers, and 
counters. Even small algorithmic and architectural improvements in the 
implementation of RSA, which is realized with large operands (> 512 bits), are of big 
importance. Below are some important points in RSA implementation. 
4.1 Exponentiation Methods 
The simplest method to realize the modular exponentiation operation 
NMC E mod= , is to start with NMC mod:=  and keep on multiplying the result 
with M continuously for 1−E  times [2]. This is obviously the most time consuming 
and infeasible way to do the exponentiation. 
4.1.1 The Binary Method 
The “binary method”, which is also called the “square and multiply method”, scans 
the bits of exponent E  one by one [2]. This scanning can be performed either from 
left to right or vice a versa. Let E  be a k -bit number. The binary method algorithm 
is given in Algorithm 4.1. 
Algorithm 4.1: The Binary Method – left to right 
Inputs: ( )1 1 0 2kN n n n−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kE e e e−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kM m m m−= L . 
Output: NMC E mod=  
1.if 11 =−ke  then MC =:  else 1:=C  
2.for 2−= ki  down to 0 do 
3.   NCCC mod: ⋅=  
4.   if 1ie =  then NMCC mod: ⋅=  
5.return C  
If 11 =−ke , the binary method requires 1−k  squarings and 1)( −EH  multiplications, 
where )(EH  is the Hamming weight of E . Assuming 0>E , which is a must for 
RSA, this holds for the Hamming weight: 
1)(0 −≤≤ kEH  (4.1) 
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This gives us an average )(EH  of ( )1
2
1
−k . The total number of multiplications – 
assuming the squaring is performed with the same algorithm as multiplication – for 
the binary method is given in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: The multiplications required by the binary method 
The Binary Method Multiplications 
Maximum ( )12 −k  
Minimum 1−k  
Average ( )12
3
−k  
 
The number of average multiplications for k=512 bit key length is 767. 
4.1.2 The m-ary Method 
The m-ary method [12] reduces the number of multiplications processed in an 
exponentiation. This method is what the binary method would turn into, if we were 
using m-ary representation instead of the binary representation. The exponent E  is 
scanned here r -bits at a time, where rm 2= , and ksr = . A preprocessing is 
necessary for the exponentiation process, in which the powers of NM mod  from 2 
to 1−m  are calculated [2]. This method is more specifically called the “quaternary 
method” when 2=m  and the “octal method” when 3=m . The m-ary method is 
given in Algorithm 4.2. 
Algorithm 4.2: The m-ary Method 
Inputs: ( )1 1 0 2kN n n n−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kE e e e−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kM m m m−= L . 
Output: NMC E mod=  
1.Compute and store NM w mod  for 1,,4,3,2 −= mw L  
2.Decompose E  into r -bit words iF  for 1,,2,1,0 −= si L , ksr =  
3. NMC sF mod: 1−=  
4.for 2−= si  down to 0 do 
5.   NCCC
r
mod: 2⋅=  
6.   if 0≠iF  then NMCC i
F
mod: ⋅=  
7.return C  
Table 4.2 shows the average number of multiplications (including squarings) 
required by the m-ary method. For the hardware implementation, the m-ary method 
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requires more area when compared to the binary method; an extra of 2−m  k-bit 
registers. 
Table 4.2: The average multiplications required by the m-ary Method 
m-ary Method Average multiplications 
Preprocessing 22 −r  
Squarings rk −  
Multiplications ( )r
r
k
−
−





− 211  
Total ( )rr
r
k
rk −−





−+−+− 21122  
4.1.3 The Sliding Window Technique 
In the m-ary method, a zero word makes us skip the multiplication. In order to 
increase the number of skipped operations and reduce the number of total 
operations executed, the sliding window technique has been suggested in [12,13]. A 
sliding window exponentiation algorithm decomposes E  into zero and nonzero 
words, which are called windows. In this technique, nonzero words cannot end with 
0. Therefore the multiplications in the preprocessing step are only done to evaluate 
the odd numbers: 1-m, 3,5,7,L . The preprocessing multiplications are almost 
halved. 
Two algorithms using this technique are “Constant Length Nonzero Window” 
(CLNW) proposed by Knuth [12], and “Variable Length Nonzero Window” (VLNW) 
by Bos and Coster [13]. Both algorithms scan the exponent bits from right to left. In 
CLNW, the algorithm checks the first bit of the window, if it is a 0, then it becomes a 
zero window (ZW) and keeps that way until a 1 comes. A 1 starts a nonzero window 
(NW) and keeps that way for a constant length of d-bits. In VLNW algorithm, d is the 
maximum nonzero window length, which means that, during the formation of a NW, 
we switch to Z when all the remaining bits are all zero. Another variable q defines 
the minimum number of zeros required to switch to ZW. The ZWs are where 
repetitive squarings are performed, and the NWs require preprocessing at the 
beginning of the algorithm.  
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For example, the exponent ( )2011110010100=E  is partitioned differently with the 
mentioned algorithms. The output of CLNW is ( )
2
001,0,101,00,111=E  whilst the 
output of VLNW is ( )
2
1,000,101,00,111=E .  
The analysis performed in [14] shows that the VLNW algorithm requires 5-8% fewer 
multiplications than the m-ary method, namely 6,37% for 512-bit key length. 
4.2 Montgomery Multiplication 
In 1985 Montgomery introduced a new method for modular multiplication [3]. The 
approach of Montgomery avoids the time consuming trial division that is a bottleneck 
for most other algorithms. His method is very efficient and is the basis of many 
implementations of modular multiplication, both in software and hardware [15]. 
The modular exponentiation in RSA obviously requires repeated modular 
multiplications. In 1985, Montgomery introduced an algorithm for computing 
NabR mod= , which is in total, more efficient than first multiplying and afterwards 
finding the N  residue, which would have required k  times k -bit additions for the 
multiplication, and k  times k -bit subtractions and comparisons for the division [3]. 
The Montgomery algorithm computes the result by replacing the division operation 
with k  times the division by a power of 2, where a , b , and n  are k -bit binary 
numbers. Thus, not only computation time, but also area is reduced in hardware 
implementations. Montgomery multiplication is defined as  
NrbaR mod1−′′=′ ,  (4.2) 
where kr 2= , and the real multiplicands a  and b  are needed to be transformed 
into their N -residues such as 
Nraa mod⋅=′ .  (4.3) 
When Eq.(4.2) and (4.3) are combined, we get 
NabrNarbrrR modmod1 ==′ − .  (4.4) 
Eq.(4.3) is the preprocessing of Montgomery Multiplication. As R′  is not the final 
result of the multiplication, we need a post-processing, where R′  and 1 are the 
multiplicands of the Montgomery Multiplication, shown in Eq.(4.5). 
( ) NabNrabrR modmod1 1 =⋅⋅= −  (4.5) 
The division process is replaced with multiplying by k−2 . Algorithm 4.3 shows how 
this division is done, which can be realized by simply 1 bit shifting in k  steps.  
As the processing and preprocessing steps are multiplication processes themselves, 
the overhead in this multiplication procedure is meaningful only when the 
 12 
Montgomery Multiplication is done a number of times – for an exponentiation, for 
example. This makes Montgomery Multiplication suitable for RSA. 
In Algorithm 4.3, kT  is inside the interval ( )N2,0 ; and therefore a final subtraction is 
needed if kT  is greater than 1−N . In [16] this comparison and subtraction operation 
is omitted by slightly modifying the algorithm. Our implementation uses the 
Montgomery Multiplication algorithm that has no final subtraction as given in 
Algorithm 4.4. It saves us from using additional hardware for the comparison and 
subtraction, by spending two more rounds in the for loop, adding and dividing by 2. 
Also it will be differential timing attack resistant given in [17]. The operands except 
the public key N  are extended by 1 bit, with a ‘0’ is added as the most significant bit. 
In Algorithm 4.4, kT  is inside the interval ( )N,0 ; and therefore a final subtraction is 
not needed. 
Algorithm 4.3: Montgomery Modular Multiplication with Final Subtraction (MonPro) 
Inputs: ( )1 1 0 2kN n n n−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kX x x x−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kY y y y−= L , 2 modkr N= , 
0 1n = . 
Output: MonPro ( ) 1, , mod 2 modkX Y N XYr N XY N− −= =  
1. 0 : 0T =  
2.for i  from 0 to 1k −  do 
3.   if ( )0 iT x Y+  is even then 
4.      ( )1 : / 2i i iT T x Y+ = +  
5.   else ( )1 : / 2i i iT T x Y N+ = + +  
6.if kT N≥  then :k kT T N= −  
7.return kT  
Algorithm 4.4: Montgomery Multiplication with No Final Subtraction (MonPro_NFS) 
Inputs: ( )1 1 0 2kN n n n−= L , ( )1 0 2kX x x x= L , ( )1 0 2kY y y y= L , 22 modkr N+= , 
0 1n = . 
Output: MonPro_NFS ( ) ( )21, , mod 2 modkX Y N XYr N XY N− +−= =  
1. 0 : 0T =  
2.for i from 0 to 1k +  do 
3.   if ( )0 iT x Y+  is even then 
4.      ( )1 : / 2i i iT T x Y+ = +  
5.   else ( )1 : / 2i i iT T x Y N+ = + +  
6.return kT  
The exponentiation is realized by squaring and multiplications, while the bits of the 
exponent E  are scanned. The number E  can be k  bits, but it can be less. 
Therefore the multiplications do not start until the actual most significant bit of E , 
where the first ‘1’ is seen. Afterwards a squaring is done for every bit of E , and a 
multiplication is done if the scanned bit is ‘1’. 
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When the exponentiation operation uses Montgomery Multiplication Algorithm, it 
needs a preprocessing, where the N  residue of the base number is calculated 
shown in Eq.(4.3); and a post-processing where the result transferred from the N  
residue to normal state. A constant number has to be calculated for the 
preprocessing to evaluate the N  residue of the plaintext as shown in Eq.(4.3). This 
constant number is Nk mod22  when using MonPro algorithm, which becomes 
Nk mod2 42 +  when using MonPro_NFS. This constant number can be provided as 
an input to the function, as it can be calculated directly from the public key N . 
Algorithm 4.5: Montgomery Exponentiation with No Final Subtraction 
(MonExp_NFS) 
Inputs: ( )1 1 0 2kN n n n−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kE e e e−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kM m m m−= L . 
Output: modEM N  
 1. 2 4: 2 modkConst N+=  
 2. ( ): MonPro_NFS ,M M Const′ =  
 3. MR ′=′ :  
 4. 0:=Start  
 5.for 1i k= −  down to 0 do 
 6.   if 1=Start  then 
 7.      ( )RRNFSoMonR ′′=′ ,_Pr:  
 8.      if 1ie =  then ( )MRNFSoMonR ′′=′ ,_Pr:  
 9.   else if 1ie =  then 1:=Start  
10. ( ): MonPro_NFS ,1R R′=  
11.return R  
4.3 Carry Save Adder 
Adders are necessary for the realization of multiplication operations. Adders are 
necessary for Montgomery multiplication also, namely for step 4 and 5 of Algorithm 
4.4. Carry save addition is suitable especially for large operands [4]. It is an 
appropriate way of reducing 3 k -bit operands to 2 k -bit operands. As a result of 
this property, Carry Save Adders (CSAs) are used when there are too many inputs 
to be added, like in the case of multiplication of large operands. CSA has been used 
in the implemented Montgomery Multiplier within this thesis work. As seen in Figure 
4.1, a CSA consists of full adders unconnected with each other. Instead of 
connecting the carry output of one full adder to the next, like in Carry Ripple Adder, 
here all carry bits form a line, shifted 1 bit left. The carry input ports are used for the 
third summand. Thus every time one summand is added to the previous 2 results, a 
new set of 2 results is formed. 
In CSA, there are no horizontal connections, and thus the maximum frequency of 
the adder is determined by the delay of one full adder, no matter what the size of the 
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adder is. Thus when a k -bit times k -bit multiplication operation is processed, the 
result is evaluated at the end of k  cycles. CSAs are favorable for Montgomery 
Multiplication in RSA, where working frequency is important. However it has to be 
indicated that the result is in carry save representation (C,S). One final addition has 
to be done to reduce the result from 2 k -bit operands to 1 k -bit operand – to 
convert back to normal number representation. Carry Ripple Pipelined Adder 
(CRPA) has been given as an example to this needed adder in the next chapter. 
FA0
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X1 Y1
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Xk-2Yk-2
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Yk-1
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Xk-1 Zk-2
C1
FA2
X2 Y2
S2
Z2
C2
 
Figure 4.1: Carry Save Adder (CSA) 
4.4 Carry Ripple Pipelined Adder 
Carry Ripple Adders (CRA) and Carry Look Ahead Adders (CLAA) bring reasonably 
much delay for large operands [18]. The latter also brings a noteworthy hardware. A 
CRA of w-bit operand size includes w  Full Adders (FA) in which the carry output of 
the ith Full Adder is the carry input of the (i+1)th Full Adder (Figure 4.2). The delay 
of the Carry Ripple Adder is the delay of w  times the carry delay of one Full Adder, 
which makes ( )XORORANDw ++  gate delays (See Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.2: Carry Ripple Adder (CRA) 
Carry Ripple Pipelined Adder (CRPA) has been used in the implementation of this 
thesis to add the carry save pair at the end of Montgomery exponentiation and 
finalize the result. CRPA is a kind of adder constructed by pipelining Carry Ripple 
Adders (CRA). A CRA of w -bit operand size includes w  Full Adders (FA) in which 
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the carry output of the ith Full Adder is the carry input of the (i+1)th Full Adder. The 
delay of the Carry Ripple Adder is the delay of w  Full Adders. Therefore it is not 
suitable for large operands. 
The adder to be used with large operands will increase the maximum frequency of 
the circuit if the execution is done in one clock cycle. Pipelining the addition 
operation into words is therefore a solution to this problem. 
 
Figure 4.3: Full Adder (FA) 
A Carry Ripple Pipelined Adder (CRPA) is a kind of adder constructed by pipelining 
CRAs. It processes k-bit operands word by word by in wk  clock cycles using a w -
bit CRAs (Figure 4.4). The carry output of the last FA in the chain, wC , is registered, 
and is given to the carry input of the first FA. 
 
Figure 4.4: Carry Ripple Pipelined Adder (CRPA) 
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5. SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS 
In cryptography, an attack based on side channel information is called a “side-
channel attack”. Side-channel information is the information that can be retrieved 
from the encryption device that is neither the plaintext to be encrypted nor the 
ciphertext resulting from the encryption process [5]. 
Active attacks, also referred as tampering attacks, require access to the internal 
circuitry of the attacked device [5]. There are two types: 
• Probing attack [19] 
• Fault induction attack [20,21] 
In passive attacks, the effects of the processing device are measured and used to 
retrieve the private key. These have mainly four types according to the type of the 
revealed output: 
• Timing Analysis [22] 
• Power Analysis [23] 
• Electromagnetic Analysis [23] 
• Acoustic Analysis [24] 
All passive attacks can be either simple or differential. The difference is that, while in 
simple analysis attacks, the attacker needs only one measurement, he needs 
numerous measurements and statistics of these measurements in differential 
analysis attacks. 
5.1 Timing Analysis Attacks 
For RSA, the square and multiply method is completed with k squarings and the 
number of Hamming weight of the exponent ( ( )EH ) multiplications in total. The 
attacker can calculate the Hamming weight of the exponent by measuring the 
exponentiation time [22]. One countermeasure to prevent this attack is to always 
perform a multiplication after each squaring, but not to store the result of the 
multiplication for the 0 bits. The implementation of this countermeasure gives us a 
constant of k multiplications and k squarings, which makes k2  multiplications in 
total. 
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5.2 Power Analysis Attacks 
Power Analysis (PA) attacks are based on analyzing the power consumption of the 
cryptographic device while it performs encryption or decryption [6]. The physical 
supporting point of these attacks is that today Complementary Metal Oxide 
Semiconductor (CMOS) technology is the one to be used most commonly for digital 
integrated circuit implementations. The power consumption during transitions of a 
CMOS gate is not the same for 10 →  transitions and 01 →  transitions. As shown 
in Figure 5.1, 10 →  transitions are using more power than the other. This gives the 
attacker a good starting point, where he uses Hamming weight information leaks. By 
this way, the amount of current being discharged can be calculated. 
 
Figure 5.1: The output of a CMOS inverter and the dissipated current 
A small (e.g., 50 ohm) resistor inserted in series with the power input of the circuit, in 
order to measure the change in its power consumption. 
5.2.1 Simple Power Analysis Attacks 
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks are generally based on looking at the visual 
representation of the power consumption of a unit while an encryption operation is 
being performed [6]. SPA is a technique that involves direct interpretation of power 
consumption measurements collected during cryptographic operations. SPA can 
yield information about a device’s operation as well as key material.  
The attacker observes the power consumption of the cryptosystem directly. In RSA, 
SPA can reveal the difference between multiply and square operations. For this 
attack to be available on RSA, the system has to either involve a microprocessor, or 
use different modules for multiplication and squaring if using a Field Programmable 
Gate Array (FPGA) or an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). 
5.2.2 Differential Power Analysis Attacks 
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks consist not only of visual, but also 
statistical analysis and error correction statistical methods, to obtain the secret keys 
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[6]. The attacker monitors the power consumption of the cryptographic device for 
many inputs, and afterwards analyzes the collected power signal data statistically. 
Using the result of the statistical analysis, the attacker extracts the secret key. DPA 
attacks can be used against both secret and private key cryptosystems, stated by 
Kocher et al [6]. 
There are two types of power consumption leakage that can be observed: the 
transition leakage and the Hamming weight leakage. The transition count 
information leaks when the dominant source of the current is due to switching of the 
gates. The power dissipated increases with the number of switching gates. The 
power consumption seen by the measurement from the total power source of a 
hardware will depend on the total number of gates that switch their states. 10 →  
transitions have a greater effect than 01 →  transitions on the total power 
consumption [5]. This is taken into account in predictions and mostly, the 01 →  
transitions are ignored in the calculation. 
A Hamming weight leakage occurs when a pre-charged bus design is used. In this 
case, the number of zeros driven onto the pre-charged bus directly determines the 
amount of current that is being discharged. This effect can be seen on the falling 
edges of the output of an inverter. As in the pre-charged bus, if the previous states 
of the outputs of some gates in the circuit are known and constant for every data, 
then the power consumption measured from the total power source will give 
information about the Hamming weight of the current state of these gates [5]. 
5.3 Countermeasures against Power Analysis Attacks 
Countermeasures against PA attacks have two main groups: hardware and software 
countermeasures [5,25].  
5.3.1 Hardware Countermeasures 
Hardware countermeasures are usually independent from the encryption or 
decryption algorithm. They provide a hardware modification to the circuit. 
5.3.1.1  Noise Generator 
Kocher et al. have proposed adding a Random Number Generator (RNG) to 
increase and randomize the measurement noise [6]. This solution is relatively simple 
and efficient against attacks, but expensive to implement and not energy efficient. It 
might be disabled through tampering. 
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5.3.1.2 Power signal filtering 
Coron et al. have proposed the power signal filtering method to obscure the 
measurements [26,27]. While the design might be relatively simple and efficient 
against attacks, it requires a change to the hardware and might be disabled through 
tampering. There are two types of filters proposed: active and passive. 
5.3.1.3 Novel circuit designs 
There are also novel circuit designs which are more specifically targeted to solve the 
DPA attack problem. Shamir has proposed detachable power supplies [27]. While 
the design may be relatively simple and efficient against attacks, it may be 
susceptible to tampering attacks. 
5.3.2 Software Countermeasures 
Software countermeasures propose an algorithmic solution to the problem.  
5.3.2.1 Time randomization  
In time randomization method, the order of the operations, or the intervals of 
operations in an execution are randomized [7,26,28-30]. This method increases the 
difficulty to attack. It might be cheap to implement in software, however it might be 
expensive to implement in hardware. 
5.3.2.2 Masking techniques 
Duplication was proposed by Goubin and Patari in [31] and by Messerges in [32]. 
This method eliminates the threat of 1st-order DPA, however the device is still 
susceptible to 2nd-order DPA attacks. Besides, some cryptographic functions may 
be hard to mask. 
5.4 Countermeasures for RSA against Power Analysis Attacks 
Throughout this study, the literature has been investigated for countermeasures. 
Most of the countermeasures for DPA attacks against RSA focus on changing the 
method of exponentiation from square and multiply to another algorithm that 
includes some randomness in it. PA countermeasures have some penalties [7]: 
• The performance penalty: Especially in exponent splitting, computation time 
increases. In hardware implementations area can also be a performance 
penalty [28,30,33]. 
• Some countermeasures are applicable for RSA, but not all implementations 
of RSA [29].  
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• Some countermeasures require additional parameters, such as ( )nφ  [26], 
which belong to the secret key calculation process that is more likely not to 
be included in the main device. 
Walter has proposed in [28] an algorithm called MIST, which generates randomly 
different addition chains for performing an exponentiation. MIST, making use of a 
random divisor, makes power attacks which require averaging over a number of 
exponentiation power traces impossible, and attacks based on recognizing repeated 
use of the same pre-computed multipliers during an individual exponentiation 
infeasible. However the algorithm is suited to implementations of software – 
embedded systems and smart cards. The MIST exponentiation requires a k-bit 
(k=key length) divider for the hardware implementation, which gives both the 
quotient and the remainder as an output. The divider consumes too much area and 
also time as a result of repeated usage within the proposed algorithm.  
In [30], Chevallier-Mames proposes self-randomized algorithms, which use a 
random number, but also the exponent itself to create randomness. Here an addition 
chain is created in the preprocessing step. Parts of the exponent are subtracted 
from itself in each step of the preprocessing. However, the subtracted bits’ position, 
the subtracted range, and the compared parts change in each step. This gives the 
algorithm too much randomness; which brings security against DPA attacks, whilst it 
makes it inefficient to be implemented on hardware. The preprocessing time for the 
hardware implementation also would be infeasible. 
The width-w NAF method proposed by Okeya and Takagi in [29] depends on the 
Nonadjacent Form (NAF) representation stated in [34] by Solinas. The width-w NAF 
method is an efficient window method with small memory, which requires 22 −w  
points of table. In [29] it is converted to an SPA-resistant addition chain. The 
proposed construction is optimal in the sense of both efficiency and memory. The 
memory requirement of scheme is smaller than that of [35], which is based on the 
signed w2 -ary method. Unlike the previously explained algorithms, this method does 
not create only positive members on the addition chain. The NAF representation 
takes ( )132 −  instead of 31 for example. Therefore, we could simply say that using 
NAF representation, the calculation of 31M  requires 5 squarings plus 1 
multiplication with 1−M  instead of 4 squaring and 4 multiplications. On the other 
hand, the need for inversion is required for RSA. Modular inversing is an area and 
time consuming operation, which would be a major offset for the preprocessing. This 
makes it an infeasible solution for RSA. This method can be feasible for the 
implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [36]. As the squaring 
corresponds to doubling and multiplication corresponds to addition in ECC, the 
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division will correspond to a subtraction. This algorithm requires no major extra 
hardware for the ECC. Also in [35,37,38] similar methods which are infeasible for 
RSA, but can be feasible for ECC have been used. 
Itoh et al. in [7] have proposed three algorithms as DPA countermeasures which are 
applicable to both RSA and ECC cryptosystems. All three countermeasures are 
based on the window method mentioned earlier in Chapter 4.1.3. In the first 
algorithm introduced, “Overlapping Window Method” (O-WM), two continuous 
windows iω and 1+iω  overlap each other at the same bit position of E , the exponent. 
Here, iω  is a random number. An intermediate exponent value is created using 
iω series and the random size of the non overlapped part of the window, ih . In 
comparison with the m-ary method, the overhead for table making is the same, but 
the number of repeating the table look-up operations is larger. Besides the 
processing time penalty of the algorithm, the preprocessing operations have too 
much randomness, which makes it hard to implement in hardware. The size of the 
operands in the preprocessing steps is even random. 
The second algorithm proposed by Itoh et al. [7] is “Randomized Table Window 
Method” (RT-WM). This algorithm needs a b-bit random number r . The exponent is 
re-calculated using the random number and some intermediate values are formed in 
return, which are used to form a table. In comparison with the m-ary method, the 
number of repeating table look-up operations are the same, but the overhead for the 
computation of table-making and normalization are larger. 
The third algorithm proposed by Itoh et al. [7] is “Hybrid Randomizing Window 
Method” (HR-WM) is a hybrid technique of the first two, O-WM and RT-WM.  
In this study, RT-WM algorithm was implemented as a countermeasure against DPA 
attacks The RT-WM algorithm is explained in detail in Chapter 5.4.1. 
5.4.1 Randomized Table Window Method (RT-WM) 
The “Randomized Table Window Method” (RT_WM) algorithm proposed by Itoh et 
al. is given in Algorithm 5.1. This algorithm is a DPA countermeasure both for RSA 
and ECC based on the window method mentioned earlier in Chapter 4.1.3. The 
main difference from the window method is that, RT-WM uses randomized data 
inside the table instead of sequential powers of M. 
The subtrahend containing the random number is shifted left in every step by t-bits 
( bt < ), which creates an overlapping part of ( )tb − -bits. The subtractions are 
repeated as long as the result will remain positive. The subtractions result with an 
intermediate value of Ew  which is the concatenation of an array [ ]iω  and a 
normalization value dm . 
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Algorithm 5.1: RT-WM (Randomized Table Window Method) 
Inputs: ( )1 1 0 2kN n n n−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kE e e e−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kM m m m−= L   
        NConst k mod2: )2(2 +=  
Output: NM E mod  
 1. =:r (b-bit random number); /* Generate random number */ 
 2. ( ) tbkcount −=:_ω         /* Pre-computation Phase 1 starts */ 
 3. rsubt =:  
 4.for 0=i  to 1_ −countω  do 
 5.   if subtdw ≥  then 
 6.      Edwdw −=:  
 7.   tsubtsubt 2: ⋅=  
 8. ( )0121: dwdwdwdwdm bb L−−=  
 9. ( )( )btcountkk dwdwdw +⋅−−−= 1_210 : ωω L  
10.for 1=i  to 1_ −countω  do 
11.   ( ) ( )( )bticountbticounti dwdw +⋅−−−+⋅−= 1_1_: ωωω L   
12. ( )ConstMNFSoMonM ,_Pr=′ /*  Enter MonPro Domain */ 
13. ': MQ =                     /* Pre-computation Phase 2 starts */ 
14. ':0 MV =  
15.if 0=dm  then 
16.   0:=Q  
17.for 1=i  to 12 −b  do 
18.   ( )MRNFSoMonR ′′=′ ,_Pr:  
19.   if 1−= dmi  then 
20.      RQ ′=:  
21.   else if 1−= ri  then 
22.      RVo ′=:  
23. RU ′=:  
24.for 1=i  to 12 −t  do       /* Pre-computation Phase 3 */ 
25.   ( )UVNFSoMonV ii ,_Pr: 1−=  
26. 0:=Start                    /* Modular Exponentiation Process */ 
27.for 0=i  to 1_ −countω  do 
28.   if 1=Start  then 
29.      
i
VR ω=′ :  
30.      for j to 1−t  do 
31.         ( )RRNFSoMonR ′′=′ ,_Pr:  
32.      if 0≠iω  then  
33.          ( )
i
VRNFSoMonR ω,_Pr: ′=′  
34.   else if 0≠iω  then 1:=Start  
35. ( )QRNFSoMonR ,_Pr: ′=′     /* Normalize Data */ 
36. ( )1,_Pr: RNFSoMonR ′=       /* Exit MonPro Domain */ 
37.return R  
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Figure 5.2 shows the steps in the first part of the pre-processing of the RT-WM 
algorithm – how the exponent E  turns into an array [ ]iω  and dm .  
11 1 0 00
10001 1 0011 111 11000
01 1 1 1 11 1 110 000 00
100001 1101 1 10 1 10
11 1 0 00
11 1 0 00 0000
0000
0000
10001 1 00100 11 1 10
dm
ω0
ω1
ω2
r
r
r
b-bit
t-bit
E
Ew
b-bitt-bit
k-bit
t-bitt-bit
 
Figure 5.2: Evaluating intermediate values out of the exponent 
The recalculation of E  determines how the table and the rest of the algorithm works. 
Eq. 5.1 shows how [ ]iω , dm , r , b , and t  make up the exponent E . 
( )( )( ) dmrrrE bsttbtb ++⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= 222222 10 ωωω LL  (5.1) 
The calculation for the table values are given in Eq. 5.2 and computed in pre-
computation phases 2 and 3.  
r
i
b
iMV += 2ω  (5.2) 
Using the values in the table, the rest of the algorithm becomes like “square for t2  
times and multiply with a table value” until the mentioned equation is evaluated. This 
algorithm brings a preprocessing time, and additional memory for the table is 
required. An extra subtraction module is not necessary if an adder is already being 
used within the RSA. 
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6. IMPLEMENTATION 
On the way to achieve a DPA resistant implementation of the RSA cryptosystem, 
the first step is to implement an unprotected one. The aim of this first step is for the 
RSA cryptosystem to be functionally correct. The second step is to prove that this 
implementation cannot stand against DPA attacks. The third step is to choose a 
countermeasure against DPA attacks and implement upon the unprotected 
implementation. In this document, the implementations will be called “the 
unprotected implementation” and “the protected implementation” respectively. 
6.1 Unprotected RSA Cryptosystem Implementation 
In order to implement the RSA cryptosystem, Montgomery Multiplication block has 
been realized with MonPro_NFS_CSA algorithm, which is given as Algorithm 6.1. 
This algorithm does no final subtraction like in the previously explained Algorithm 
4.4. When Montgomery multiplication is realized using normal number 
representation, the operands look like in Figure 6.1. When it is realized using Carry 
Save representation then the multiplicand, multiplier and the result are doubled as 
Carry and Save, shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.1: Operands of a standard Montgomery multiplier 
 
Figure 6.2: Operands of a Montgomery multiplier using Carry Save Representation 
The RSA Encryption/Decryption algorithm, which uses Montgomery Multiplication, 
also changes accordingly and it is named MonExp_NFS_CSA [39], given in 
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Algorithm 6.2. The adder required by the encryption process is realized as CRPA, 
explained in Chapter 4.4. 
Algorithm 6.1: Montgomery Multiplication with No Final Subtraction using Carry 
Save Adder Representation (MonPro_NFS_CSA) 
Inputs: ( )2011 xcxcxcXC k L+= , ( )2011 xsxsxsXS k L+= , 
( )2011 ycycycYC k L+= , ( )2011 ysysysYS k L+= , ( )2011 nnnN k L−= , 
Nr k mod2 2+= , 10 =n . 
Output: ( ) ( ) ( ) NrYSYCXSXCRSRC mod,,, 1−⋅⋅=   
 1. ( )2011 tctctcTC k L+= , ( )2011 tststsTS k L+=  
 2. 0:0 =TC ; 0:0 =TS  
 3.for i from 0 to 1+k  do 
 4. iii xsxcx +=:  
 5. ( ) 0:1,1 YCxTSTCSC iiiii ⋅++=  
 6. ( ) 011:2,2 YSxSCSC iiiii ⋅++=  
 7.if 02 0 =is  then 
 8 .   ( ) ( ) 2/022:, ++= iiii SCTSTC  
 9.else ( ) ( ) 2/22:, NSCTSTC iiii ++=   
10.return ( )11, ++ kk TSTC  
Algorithm 6.2: RSA Encryption with Montgomery Multiplication with No Final 
Subtraction using Carry Save Adder Representation (MonExp_NFS_CSA) 
Inputs: ( )1 1 0 2kN n n n−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kE e e e−= L , ( )1 1 0 2kM m m m−= L   
        NConst k mod2: )2(2 +=  
Output: modEM N  
 1. 0:=Start  
 2. ( ) ( )NConstMCSANFSoMonSMCM ,0,,0,__Pr:, =′′  
 3. ( ) ( )SMCMSRCR ′′=′′ ,:,  
 4.for 1−= ki  down to 0 do 
 5.   if 1=Start  then 
 6.      ( ) ( )NSRCRSRCRCSANFSoMonSRCR ,,,,__Pr:, ′′′′=′′  
 7.      if 1=ie  then  
 8.          ( ) ( )NSMCMSRCRCSANFSoMonSRCR ,,,,__Pr:, ′′′′=′′  
 9.   else if 1=ie  then 1:=Start  
10. ( ) ( )NSRCRCSANFSoMonRSRC ,0,1,,__Pr:, ′′=  
11. RSRCR +=:  
12.return R  
Two modules have been used inside the top level module: MonExp_NFS_CSA and 
a communication module PC2FPGA. Inside MonExp_NFS_CSA there is 
MonPro_NFS_CSA and CRPA. Inside CRPA, there is a CRA. Figure 6.3 shows the 
I/O ports, blocks, and connections, and important registers inside the RSA 
implementation. 
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Figure 6.3: RSA module and its blocks 
6.1.1 Hardware Implementation 
Figure 6.4 shows the main processing element of the hardware implementation 
using CSA representation, which was functionally described in Algorithm 6.2, 
MonPro_NFS_CSA. There are three levels of CSAs, which determine the 
multiplier’s delay. 
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Figure 6.4: HW implementation of the Montgomery Multiplication unit using CSAs 
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Figure 6.5: State machine of RSA main block 
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MonExp_NFS_CSA is implemented with a finite state machine as given in Figure 
6.5. This algorithm has four inputs as M, E, N, and the constant number. E, N, and 
Const= Nk mod2 42 +  do not change for every encryption, only M does. Hence there 
are two loading options: load all inputs or load M only. Afterwards a Start signal is 
waited. Then the algorithm enters the Montgomery domain and calculates (M’C,M’S) 
from M and Const using MonPro_NFS_CSA. It scans until the leftmost nonzero bit 
of the exponent and continues with squaring. The square and multiply process is 
continued until all the bits of E are scanned. Then the MonPro domain is to be exited 
by doing Montgomery multiplication on the current result (R’C,R’S) and 1. The result 
is still a carry save pair (RC,RS) afterwards. RC and RS are added using the CRPA. 
The exponentiation result is ready when this final addition is over. 
6.1.2 Software for Verification 
The software model which was used for verification has been realized exactly to 
match the steps implemented in hardware. The software code, like the hardware 
code, has been written using generic sizes. This has given the chance to test the 
implementation with 32 bit key size on the first hand. The large operand sizes have 
been realized with arrays of 32 bit element size. The software supports the multiples 
of 32 as the key size: 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, etc.  
The verification of the software model itself has been checked by decrypting the 
encrypted data and comparing the plaintext with the decrypted text. The software 
takes plaintext input files, encrypts them, verifies them with decryption and creates a 
ciphertext output file. The steps can be seen in Figure 6.6. These files are to be 
used for simulation and measurements. 
RSA 
SW model
Original
Random 
plaintext
Calculated 
ciphertext
Calculated 
ciphertext
Calculated 
plaintext
?=
Calculated 
plaintext
Original
Random 
plaintext
Calculated 
ciphertext is 
verified!
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
RSA 
SW model
 
Figure 6.6: Software verification of input and output pairs 
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The software model is written with C/C++ language and it was compiled using Visual 
Studio .NET 2003. 
6.1.3 Measurement 
This unprotected implementation is expected be resistant to revealing the secret key 
in an SPA attack, because there are no different modules for squaring and 
multiplication. However this implementation is expected to be unprotected against 
SPA attacks that reveal the ( )EH  and DPA attacks that reveal the secret key. 
Figure 6.7 summarizes the steps of the measurement flow. 
One plaintext and one measurement is enough for an SPA attack. For implementing 
an SPA attack in an RSA cryptosystem, the square and multiply power consumption 
patterns have to be distinguished. This is done by looking at a single measurement 
output. 
On the other hand, tens of thousands of random plaintext inputs are given to an 
RSA cryptosystem to make a DPA attack and retrieve the private-key. 
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Data in a11
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ciphertext
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Figure 6.7: Measurement of DPA resistancy 
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We have tried to perform the measurements described here. Since the 
measurement setup was not ready, this step took more time than expected. In order 
to complete the rest of the thesis work, this step has eventually been skipped. 
6.1.4 Implementation Results 
MonPro_NFS_CSA takes 2+k  clock cycles. The maximum frequency of the 
implementation with Xilinx XC2V1500 for 512=k  is 140,96 MHz, which takes 3,65 
µs resulting in a throughput rate of 140,41 Mb/s. When implemented on Xilinx 
XC2V4000 for k=1024, the maximum frequency achieved becomes 129,05 MHz; the 
total time 7,95 µs, and the throughput rate 128,80 Mb/s. As shown in Table 6.1, the 
resulting throughput rates are faster than [40-42], and almost the same speed as 
[43], which are also architectures using CSAs to realize Montgomery multipliers. 
Table 6.1: Montgomery Multiplier implementations in comparison to previous works 
Design Device Bit 
length 
(k) 
Clock  
speed  
(MHz) 
Area  
(Slices) 
Throughput 
Rate  
(Mb/s) 
XC2V1500 512 140,96 4339 140,41 This 
work 
XC2V4000 1024 129,05 5509 128,80 
[40] XC2V1500 512 72,1 3125 71,82 
[41] XC2V1500 512 105,57 4962 105,36 
[42] XC2V1500 512 126,71 5170 126,46 
[43] FPGA 1024 129,1 3611 129 
Addition with CRPA takes wk /  clock cycles. The decision to choose the word 
length w  was done according to the optimum frequency of the synthesis results 
(See Table 6.2). In order not to make the exponentiation slower than the 
Montgomery Production block, w=16 was chosen. 
The whole RSA module, MonExp_NFS_CSA takes ( )2/32 +++ wkkk  clock cycles 
for the best case where the exponent is 12 −= kE , and ( )wkkk /42 2 ++  clock 
cycles for the worst case where the exponent is 12 −= kE . The average for the 
exponentiation is 





+++ 4/5
2
3 2
wkkk  clock cycles. Table 6.3 shows the 
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implementation results of the Montgomery multiplier modules, and the top level RSA 
modules. 
Table 6.2: Synthesis results of the CRPA module on XC2V1500 
Key length 
(bits) 
Word size 
(bits) 
Time 
(clock 
cycles) 
Area 
(Slices) 
Clock  
Speed 
(MHz) 
512 32 16 976 145,73 
512 16 32 932 179,87 
Table 6.3: Implementation results for Montgomery and RSA (top level) modules 
Design 
module 
Para- 
meters 
Time 
(Clock 
cycles) 
Time 
(Clock 
cycles) 
Area 
(Slices) 
Clock  
Speed 
(MHz) 
Through-
put rate 
(b/s) 
MonPro 
(XC2V1500) 
k=512 k+2 514 4339 140,96 140,41 M 
MonPro 
(XC2V4000) 
k=1024 k+2 1026 5509 129,05 128,80M 
RSA 
(XC2V2000) 
k=512,  
w=16 
3/2k2 +5k 
+k/w +4 
(average) 
395812 10240 116,35 150,50 K 
RSA 
(XC2V6000) 
k=1024, 
w=16 
3/2k2 +5k 
+k/w +4 
(average) 
1578020 25193 84,33 54,72 K 
For our first unprotected RSA implementation with k=512 and w=16, we get an 
average of 395812 clock cycles. The maximum frequency of the implementation 
with Xilinx XC2V2000 is 116,35 MHz, which takes an average of 3,4 ms for the 
whole exponentiation process, giving us a throughput rate of 150,50 Kb/s for the 
average case. For the best case, the exponentiation takes 263712 clock cycles 
resulting in 2,27 ms. The unprotected RSA implementation has been repeated for 
1024 bits. 
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Using the parameters as k=1024 and w=16, we get an average of 1578020 clock 
cycles. Implemented on Xilinx XC2V6000, the maximum frequency becomes 84,33 
MHz, whilst the average time for exponentiation becomes 18,71 ms resulting in a 
throughput rate of 54,72 Kb/s. For the best case, the exponentiation takes 1051712 
clock cycles which is 12,47ms. 
6.2 RSA Cryptosystem Implementation Immune to Power Analysis Attacks 
For the RT-WM algorithm (Chapter 5.4.1), which is applied as a countermeasure 
against DPA attacks in this study, the number of items in the [ ]iω  array is: 
( ) tbkcount −=_ω  (6.1) 
This gives us the number of count_ω comparisons and subtractions in 
preprocessing phase 1. 
One comparison takes one clock cycle and since the existing CRPA is used in 
subtractions, one subtraction costs w  (word count of CRPA) clock cycles.  
The 2nd phase of the preprocessing calculates NM r mod , NM dm mod , and 
NM
b
mod2 . It takes ( )12 −b  MonPro calculations for this phase. 
The 3rd phase of the preprocessing finalizes the table. The table has t2  k -bit items 
and it takes ( )12 −t  MonPro calculations to finish the table. Since one MonPro 
calculation takes ( )2+k  clock cycles in the proposed design, the total time spent in 
the preprocessing calculations becomes  
( )  ( ) ( ) ( )22221__ +⋅−+++⋅− kcountwordCRPAtbk tb  clock cycles as shown 
in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Preprocessing time equations of RT-WM algorithm 
Preprocessing Time (clock cycles) 
Prep. Phase 1 ( )  ( )1+⋅− wtbk  
Prep. Phase 2 ( ) ( )212 +⋅− kb  
Prep. Phase 3 ( ) ( )212 +⋅− kt  
Total ( )  ( ) ( ) ( )22221 +⋅−+++⋅− kwtbk tb  
The RT-WM parameters selected for this study and the resulting additional time are 
shown in Table 6.5. The exponentiation method which replaces the square and 
multiply method now becomes like t times square and multiply once with a table 
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value. A final multiplication is needed for the normalization. Therefore, accepting 
that 00 ≠ω  for k-bit exponents, the exponentiation time achieved is  
( ) ( ) ( )  ( ) 11111_ ++⋅−=++⋅− ttbktcountω  Montgomery multiplications.  
Table 6.5: Preprocessing time of RT-WM for the implementation values 
RT-WM algorithm Key 
length 
(bits) 
b  
(bits) 
t 
(bits) 
CRPA 
word 
count 
Time  
(clock 
cycles) 
Pre- 
processing 
512 3 2 16 9492 
Since the zero windows are not skipped here, which is different than the m-ary 
method, the best case, the average case and the worst case exponentiation time in 
RT-WM method are the same. In addition to the mentioned preprocessing, 2 
multiplications are needed for entering and exiting the MonPro domain (Algorithm 
5.1) and wk /  clock cycles are needed for CRPA addition. Table 6.6 shows the 
exponentiation time and the total time spent in RT-WM algorithm.  
The total time required by the new algorithm, realized with 512-bit key length, 2-bit 
window length, and a 3-bit random number, needs 404276 clock cycles and brings 
an overhead of 11,8% in total time (in clock cycles), when compared to the m-ary 
method. The m-ary method needs an average of 703,25 multiplications (See Table 
4.2), which makes 361471 clock cycles. The reason why we compare this result with 
the results of the m-ary exponentiation method, is that both methods use t size 
windows, where tm 2= . This preprocessing brings an overhead of 2,1% in total 
time when compared to the binary method. 
Table 6.6: RT-WM exponentiation and total time 
Exp. Time (clock cycles) 
(parametric) 
Exp. Time  
(clk cycles)  
(k=512, b=3, t=2) 
Total Time 
(clk 
cycles) 
( )  ( )( ) ( ) wkkttbk /231 ++⋅++⋅−  394784 404276 
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6.2.1 Hardware Implementation 
Figure 6.8 shows the state machine of the RT-WM implementation of the RSA 
cryptosystem. As it can be seen, new states have been added: Preprocess 1, 
Preprocess 2, Preprocess 3, and Normalize – which are shown on the right side of 
the figure. The time spent, in these additional states has been explained in Chapter 
6.2. Preprocessing Phase 1, where Ew  is calculated, is done before entering the 
MonPro domain. Preprocessing Phases 2 and 3 are done in order to fill in the 
randomized table. RSA_Multiply and RSA_Square states have changed with 
respect to the former implementation.  
Now RSA_Square does t times squaring consecutively, once the state is entered. 
RSA_Multiply is not done with M; the corresponding table entry is used instead. 
There is a final multiplication state after the [ ]iω  array is scanned. This multiplication 
applies to the normalization step. Afterwards the state machine enters the 
Exit_MonPro state, and the rest is followed as stated in the former state machine, 
shown in Figure 6.5. 
6.2.2 Implementation Results 
The implementation results of the RT-WM algorithm, realized with 512-bit key length, 
2-bit window length, and, a 3-bit random number, on Xilinx XCV2600E, are shown in 
Table 6.7. An exponentiation time of 18,43 Kb/s throughput and an area of 22712 
slices are achieved. The maximum clock frequency is 14,55 MHz. The total 
encryption process takes 27,79 ms, which was 3,4 ms for the unprotected 
implementation. 
Table 6.7: Implementation results for RSA with RT-WM 
Design 
module 
Parameters 
Time 
(Clock 
cycles) 
Area 
(Slices) 
Clock  
Speed 
(MHz) 
Throughput 
rate (Kb/s) 
RSA 
(XCV2600E) 
k=512, w=16, 
b=3, t=2 
404276 22712 14,55 18,43 
The unprotected implementation fits into XCV1000E, occupying 9037 slices, which 
is 73% of the available slices. When implementing the protected architecture, a 
major modification is done in the state machine (Figure 6.8); but the main hardware 
need is 6 pair of k-bit registers due to the RT-WM algorithm (Algorithm 5.1). 
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Figure 6.8: State Machine of RT-WM implementation of RSA 
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As there are two registers in each slice of Virtex-E family, this need causes an 
inefficient use of the slices which prevents fitting into the same device. The number 
of slices are 2,5 times the unprotected implementation. Thus the routing also 
becomes inefficient causing a great decrease in the speed (Table 6.7). 
6.3 Optimization of Hardware Implementation 
The measurement setup includes the FPGA XCV1000E, from the Xilinx Virtex-E 
family. The previously mentioned implementation results of the unprotected design 
were realized on FPGA devices from the Xilinx Virtex-II family, to be able to 
compare with the previous designs in the literature, which were also implemented on 
Xilinx Virtex-II family.  
Table 6.8: All implementation results on Virtex-E family devices 
Design  Unprotected RSA  Protected RSA  Protected RSA 
Device XCV1000E XCV2600E XCV1000E 
Parameters k=512, w=16 
k=512, w=16, 
b=3, t=2 
k=512, w=16, 
b=3, t=2 
Block RAM 
(CountxEntryxWidth) 
No No 2x4x513  
Area (slices) 9037 22712 10986 
Time (clock cycles) 395812 404276 404276 
Clock Speed (MHz) 81,06 14,55 66,66 
Throughput rate 
(Kbit/s) 104,85 18,43 84,42 
Exponentiation time 
(ms) 
4,88 27,79 6,06 
In order to ensure future measurements of the unprotected and protected designs 
accomplished throughout this study, these designs were implemented on Xilinx 
Virtex 1000E, too. The unprotected design fit into the XCV1000E occupying 9037 
slices, which is 73% of the available slices. Meanwhile, the protected design needed 
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22712 slices which could fit into the XCV2600E. Therefore the protected design 
needed an optimization to become measurable with the available measurement 
setup. 
Virtex-E family FPGAs incorporate large block SelectRAM memories, where the 
data widths of the ports can be configured, and the routing is optimized. Hence we 
used these built-in block RAM structures for the protected design in order to fit into 
the XCV1000E. The RT-WM algorithm needs 8x513 bits to be used as the 
“randomized table” values for the chosen parameters (Chapter 6.2), which were 
realized with registers. One needs to separate the carry and save pairs in different 
RAM blocks in order to have read/write access to them at the same clock cycle. 
Therefore two RAM blocks of 513-bit data length and 4 entries have been defined. 
The resulting implementation fit into the device occupying 10986 slices, as 89% of 
the available slices. All implementation results on Virtex-E family devices are given 
in Table 6.8. Comparing the protected RSA implementations, we see that the clock 
speed increased from 14,55 MHz to 66,66 MHz, making the average case 
throughput increase from 18,48 Kb/s to 84,42 Kb/s. Total exponentiation time is 
reduced from 27,11 ms to 6,06 ms. The time and area cost of the protected design 
is reduced with block SelectRAM usage. 
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7. RESULTS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have implemented RSA cryptosystem by using Montgomery multiplier and all 
the additions in the Montgomery multiplier are performed by Carry Save Addition 
(CSA). CSA is an appropriate way of reducing 3-k bit operands to 2-k bit operands. 
Hence, throughout the algorithm, each number is represented by a pair as sum and 
carry. At the end of the square and multiply algorithm the numbers in the resulting 
pair are added to form the result. We give the comparisons with the previous 
Montgomery multiplier architectures, which also used CSAs. Our implementation is 
faster than the compared architectures except one, which is almost the same speed 
as ours [39]. 
The second architecture of this study has made the cryptosystem resistant against 
DPA attacks. With the final optimization using block SelectRAM structures, the total 
time has increased by 24,2% with respect to the unprotected implementation, while 
the throughput rate decreased by 19,5%. Thus, the final protected implementation 
became DPA resistant, still fitting into the same device, but slower.  
The aim of the optimization was in fact, to enable the future work mentioned below. 
Following the implementation results described in this thesis, a number of projects 
could be taken up to accomplish the following: 
• The measurement setup completion of the unprotected implementation 
• Implementing an SPA attack on the unprotected implementation to prove 
that the Hamming weight of the exponent can be extracted 
• Applying “Always Square & Multiply Method” upon the unprotected 
implementation against SPA attacks and implementing a DPA attack on the 
implementation in the previous item to prove that the secret key can be 
extracted 
• Implementing a DPA attack against the protected implementation to prove 
that the secret key cannot be extracted 
• The design will be improved according to the attack results. 
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